Integrating Justice and Fairness as a Resolution to Indigenous Environmental Harm by Sweetland, Lauren (Author) et al.
Integrating Justice and Fairness as a Resolution to  
Indigenous Environmental Harm  
by 
Lauren Sweetland 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2014 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Elizabeth Brake, Chair 
Rebecca Tsosie 
Douglas Portmore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2014  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
Principles of climate mitigation in environmental ethics often draw on either 
considerations of fairness and forward-looking concerns, or on justice and backward-
looking concerns. That is, according to some theorists, considerations of the current 
distribution of climate benefits and burdens are foremost, while others take repairing 
historic wrongs as paramount. Some theorists integrate considerations of fairness and 
justice to formulate hybrid climate principles. Such an integrative approach is promising 
particularly in the context of environmental harm to indigenous subsistence peoples, who 
are among those suffering the most from climate change.  
I argue that existing integrative climate principles tend not to sufficiently 
emphasize considerations of backward-looking justice. This is a problem for indigenous 
peoples seeking reparations for environmental harm and violations of their human rights. 
Specifically, indigenous people in the Arctic suffer a cultural harm from climate change 
as they lose their land, and their way of life, to erosion, cementing their status as climate 
refugees. I argue that the current climate situation facing Native Arctic people is unfair 
according to Rawls' second principle of justice. In addition, the situation is unjust as 
indigenous people suffer from emissions by others and few attempts are made for 
reparations. Thus, Rawlsian fairness combined with reparative justice provide a befitting 
theoretical framework. I conclude that an acceptable climate principle will adequately 
integrate considerations of both fairness and justice, both forward-looking and backward-
looking considerations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the context of environmental justice and elsewhere, philosophers distinguish 
between forward-looking principles and backward-looking principles, between fairness 
and justice. Many prefer forward-looking principles grounded in fairness, while others 
prefer backward-looking principles grounded in justice. Still others combine both 
principles and theoretical groundings to produce an integrative principle of climate 
mitigation. However, such combinations tend to include considerations of fairness to a 
greater degree than considerations of justice.  
This asymmetrical approach is a problem for indigenous peoples in particular, 
who continue to be ignored in climate policy decisions. Indigenous peoples often suffer 
most acutely as a result of climate change, yet they contribute the least to emissions. This 
has significant implications for assessing the level of justice and for informing climate 
negotiations. I argue that an acceptable climate mitigation principle will integrate both 
fairness and justice, both forward and backward-looking considerations. Such a principle 
should include considerations of political feasibility and reparative measures for past 
injustices. I will focus my discussion on indigenous peoples, and particularly to 
indigenous groups in the Arctic (especially Alaska).1 
Indigenous peoples, such as the Yup’ik (pl Yupiit or Yupiat) of Alaska, suffer 
cultural harms and an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens from climate change. 
Because the situation is unfair, forward-looking principles may help address the harm. 
However, I argue that their situation is also unjust, and as such, backward-looking 
principles are also appropriate. I then argue forward-looking and backward-looking 
principles are not mutually exclusive, and that an acceptable climate justice principle will 
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include both kinds of consideration. Existing integrative principles tend to inadequately 
integrate backward-looking justice, especially reparative measures for historic wrongs. 
Reparations are as important as considerations of fairness, and as such, both ought to be 
included. 
The theoretical discussion will have implications for the Yupiit. Many of these 
people must relocate within the next few years, as scientists predict that their villages will 
disappear from erosion. The Yupiit and the state of Alaska have three main options for a 
plan of relocation. First, they could move their entire village, house by house, across the 
river, and with state help in the form of financial assistance. The Yupiit have chosen this 
option and are currently moving each house to the new site. This plan will cost the state 
about $130-179 million.2 Second, the Yup’ik could move to nearby city or town, such as 
Nome, also with state financial help, at a cost of about $93 million.3 A third alternative is 
that the Yupiit could choose either of the two options, but the state does not provide 
financial assistance. While the first option is desirable for several reasons, especially 
those based on the idea of reparative justice, my argument ultimately supports the second 
option of moving to a nearby place. This is due to the integrative nature of my approach.  
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ARCTIC: THE BASICS 
In Arctic regions, climate change is happening at a quicker and more intense rate 
than anywhere else on Earth. Alaska and Northern Canada experience warming two to 
three times more than equatorial regions.4 Since the 1980s, this area has experienced the 
“greatest contraction of Arctic sea ice since modern measurements began”5 with sea ice 
surface area having decreased by about 40% over the past 100 years.6 Loss of sea ice 
generates ‘feedback loops’ when warming is accelerated by newly exposed dark ocean 
waters absorbing much of the sun’s rays instead of reflecting rays with bright sea ice. In 
Alaska, average winter temperatures have increased by as much as 5° to 7°F in the past 
70 years.7 Melting of sea ice and higher temperatures contribute to sea level rise, but loss 
of glacier volume also contributes to rising seas. Glaciers in Denali National Park in 
Alaska are documented to be retreating by an average of 66 feet per year for the past 60 
years.8 Finally, permafrost on the Alaskan coast has warmed about 5°F in the past 30 
years, which renders it more vulnerable to erosion.9 
 There is very little dispute among scientists about these changes in Arctic regions. 
Scientists rely on a variety of reliable testing methods, including satellite imagery, 
detailed temperature analysis with global thermometer networks and ice column 
observation, historical photographical records, ice radar measuring devices, and laser 
altimetry measurements taken from airplanes. Geologists, biologists, anthropologists, and 
many other scientists rely on clear evidence to determine whether a given hypothesis is 
confirmed, hypotheses which adapt with new and changing evidence. There exists little to 
no speculation on the part of scientists when they deliver the results of their research 
experiments on the effects of climate change. 
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 While the existence of climate change is not disputed among scientists, 
determining the precise cause of this trend has been fairly controversial. Climate change 
skeptics argue that climate change might not be human-caused, or might not be as 
dangerous as previously thought. They argue, for example, that the media manipulates 
popular conceptions of climate change or that the sun is the main cause of warming. 
However, the vast majority of scientists specializing in the field of climate change agree 
that human-caused greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere, particularly carbon 
dioxide (CO₂), are directly and positively correlated with an increase in overall global 
temperatures, and that climate change could be dangerous. CO₂ levels in the atmosphere 
are higher now than they have been in the past 650,000 years.10 There was about one-
quarter less CO₂ in the atmosphere during the pre-industrial era (100-1750 AD) than 
there is today.11 This increase in CO₂ is directly correlated with human industrialization 
and pollution from factories, automobiles, and the burning of fossil fuels. For these 
reasons, I will assume that the science is correct and that climate change is anthropogenic 
for the purposes of the argument concerning justice and historic wrongs. 
Data from geology, meteorology, and chemistry research supports the hypothesis 
that Earth’s climate is indeed changing; in particular, average yearly ground surface 
temperature has been steadily rising to grow warmer. These changes are more extreme in 
Arctic regions than other parts of the world due to, among other things, that area’s 
acutely sensitive topography. Not only are local landmass areas in the Arctic currently 
experiencing dynamic transformations, but as a consequence the people and wildlife who 
live in these areas undergo similar transformations. 
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CULTURAL HARM, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE YUP'IK WORLDVIEW 
The dramatic effects of climate change in the Arctic greatly impact the indigenous 
peoples who live there. Rebecca Tsosie writes that the “impact of climate change, while 
problematic for all peoples, falls disproportionately on Native peoples in regions such as 
the Arctic and Pacific, where the environment is closely tied to indigenous lifeways.”12 
These locations are subject to unusually intense changes in climate and they are home to 
many indigenous groups who depend on stability of land and resources. Climate change 
damages the synergistic relationship between the natural environment and the indigenous 
people who live there. In this section, I introduce a group of Eskimo people and discuss 
their metaphysical and spiritual beliefs about nature. I then argue that they suffer a bundle 
of individual harms from climate change, which together form a cultural harm. 
The present situation of the Yup’ik people of Alaska is an interesting case in point 
for understanding the possible effects climate change.13 The majority of Yup’ik people 
live on the waterline on land that is especially vulnerable to erosion, increased storm 
intensity, and other byproducts of climate change. Several groups of Yup’ik people are 
said to be the United States’ first climate refugees as many of them must relocate in order 
to avoid sinking.14 The Yup’ik people exemplify special problems that may arise under 
conditions of climate change not only for themselves and other Arctic Native peoples, but 
for all communities similarly situated.  
As with many indigenous subsistence people, the Yup’ik people greatly suffer 
from the effects of climate change. When the land and climate begin to change in 
unexpected ways so that even the community climate experts cannot predict what will 
happen, the Yup’ik people have a difficult time practicing subsistence activities with 
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much success. The consequent instability to their lifeways as a result of climate change 
threatens to undermine their very existence. This threat is not duplicated among those in 
non-subsistence communities, for example those dependent on more ‘developed’ or 
modern means. When resources become compromised, those who ‘live off the land’ 
suffer not only from lack of adequate sustenance, but also economically, culturally, and 
spiritually. These individual harms together form a larger cultural harm. 
What is a cultural harm? There are two main types of cultural harm, as articulated 
by Tsosie. First, indigenous groups may be barred from accessing their own cultural 
systems, for example when artifacts are unjustly taken. Second, another group might 
control or exploit indigenous cultural systems, a practice known as ‘cultural 
appropriation.’15 These two types of cultural harm may overlap, for example when a 
museum asserts ownership of a sacred indigenous artifact (barring access), while 
displaying the artifact as a piece of the state’s history (cultural appropriation).16 
The bundle of cultural harms facing the Yup’ik people, which I will discuss 
shortly, more closely resembles the first type of cultural harm characterized by 
diminished access to a group’s own cultural systems. This is made clear by the steady 
destruction of nearly every aspect of their cultural life, due in large part to effects on the 
environment from climate change. Many aspects of indigenous cultural life flow from a 
relationship of reciprocity and balance with the natural environment. Perhaps the most 
profound cultural harm is that of diminished access to the natural environment, or in a 
sense, the sacred. (I will briefly note here that I hope to avoid the somewhat problematic 
depiction of a cultural harm characterized by 'blocked or barred access' to 'nature'. 
Indeed, there are no agents literally blocking anyone from accessing nature. What I 
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intend to articulate is diminishment of the Yupiit's synergistic relationship with their 
cultural system which includes nature as a kind of deity). This diminishment of cultural 
systems counts as a cultural harm, and is a consequence of climate change caused by 
others. 
Many Yup’ik people believe that “Ellam Yua, or a Spirit of the Universe” is a 
subject of the highest spiritual reverence.17 They believe that all the things of the Earth 
possess spirit, consciousness, or awareness. This might be understood as a kind of 
panpsychism, that everything contains mind or soul, but not pantheism, as the Yupiit do 
not necessarily believe that objects in nature are the subject of worship.18 Nature is to be 
treated with honor, care and respect, and objects in nature are often the centers of rituals 
and ceremonies. The land, sea, animals, plants, humans, and the like, each have a 
spiritual element and we are to live in harmony and with balance with nature. Angayuqaq 
Kawagley says about Yupiit religious tradition, “[t]he land is described in action words, 
therefore it is a process, on-going and dynamic... Nature became their metaphysic. Today, 
the Yupiat [Yup’ik] people are not living as close to nature and, as a result, suffer from a 
spiritual depression.”19 This spiritual depression is the central cultural harm which 
precludes Yupiit ability from accessing their culture. 
For many indigenous peoples, including the Yup’ik, land, nature, and 
environment are dominant figures in appropriating the highest respect and honor.20 Tsosie 
explains that many indigenous people have a kinship relationship with their environment, 
caring for the land and living and non-living beings, who are regarded as fellow ‘people’ 
and are to be treated with dignity and respect.21 This harmonious way of living with the 
environment constrains human freedom of action; for instance respect for the land 
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precludes economic development in certain areas. The worldview that the Earth, and 
indeed other aspects of the universe, as an animate life source that is sacred and a proper 
source of veneration gives rise to a guiding ethics of reciprocity and balance.22 Tsosie 
explains that many indigenous communities practice reciprocity of sharing and giving of 
personal property during ceremonies and otherwise in order to strengthen the community 
and redistribute wealth.23 The value in the balance of goods distribution is one of the 
most central guiding ethic and it works to impart moral duties on those in the community. 
However, this moral view goes beyond social obligations and prescribes special duties 
towards the earth and its people, including land, plants, and animals.24 The guiding ethics 
of reciprocity and balance, Tsosie notes, support further normative ideas of ecological 
integrity and sustainability and often, expectations of stable and permanent ties to a 
particular land place.25 Reciprocity and balance work to maintain healthy relationships 
among the community members themselves and also with nature. 
At this point, I will argue that a bundle of individual harms form a fundamental 
cultural harm of diminished access to the natural environment. The first harm concerns 
the dangers of the newly unstable ecosystem. The ecosystem that the Yup’ik people 
depend upon for their livelihoods changes and becomes unpredictable, resulting in 
unreliable or scarce resources. Wildlife populations, which the Yupiit depend on for 
subsistence means, undergo changes due to a warming climate. Mammals, birds, fish, and 
plants in western Alaska experience a recently changing ecosystem and must quickly 
adapt for survival.  
For example, many of the region’s lakes and ponds have disappeared or shrunk 
due to newly porous ground with thawed permafrost, ponds which were once home to 
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many native plants and animals. These native plants and animals were important 
subsistence resources.26 Melting sea ice retracts shelter for seals and polar bears, which is 
troublesome not only for these animals, but for the subsistence people who rely on them 
for food and clothing resources.27 Seals and polar bears in western Alaska have been 
found to display decreased health by scientists and local villagers, especially among pups 
and cubs, who are often stunted and underweight, rendering them a low-quality 
subsistence resource.28 Fewer, and less healthy, caribou causes problems for the Yupiit, 
and additional problems arise when freshwater fish and waterfowl disappear. The 
instability of these resources is difficult to cope with for the Yup’ik people, who have 
lived a steady subsistence lifestyle for thousands of years.29 Almost everywhere they look 
now, they see highly compromised wildlife that is often not suitable for consumption, if 
they see any at all.30 Thus, the Yupiit face a serious harm of ecological degradation. 
A second harm the Yup’ik suffer, due in part to climate change, is a loss of some 
traditional epistemological systems. Community elders are often leaders of a group, 
sharing traditional knowledge, wisdom and custom, spiritual and cultural beliefs, and 
practical advice, transmitted from their own ancestors.31 One Yup’ik man says, “[t]aking 
the oral instructions with you when travelling [sic] gives you good judgment… Indeed, 
when one makes an effort at following the instructions on the land and ocean and doesn’t 
forget them, they are valid” and another says “[t]he instructions aren’t mine” professing 
the idea that the age-old instructions are real and important.32 These special instructions 
for how to live are normally taken with great respect by the younger generations, who 
understand that to succeed in the traditional Yup’ik lifeway, they must heed the valuable 
advice from elders.33 However, this previously stable tradition is beginning to collapse 
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with the changing climate. Traditional knowledge of “ella,” or “weather, world, or 
universe,” and also climate, environment, and proper social behavior among 
contemporary Yup’ik people diminishes as the topography and ecosystem changes in 
unusual ways due to the changing climate. 34 Elders who were once able to accurately 
predict the weather and safe times and routes for traveling are no longer able to do so.35 
Thus ‘exposure-sensitivity’ - or “the susceptibility of people and communities to 
conditions that represent risks”, increases with the loss of traditional ecological 
knowledge and the new and changing environment.36 
Shrinking knowledge of ella among both young and old community members in 
Yupiit villages is not only dangerous for the integrity of their epistemological system, it 
is also dangerous for ella itself. Many Yup’ik people believe that failure to observe 
traditional lifeways results in disintegration of both the natural and social environments.37 
When people share resources with one another, those resources will replenish and restore 
to a natural balance. Sharing mink and muskrat with other community members, for 
example, helps to ensure that these resources do not become scarce in the future. In this 
way, ella reacts with the social environment, providing more subsistence resources when 
people reciprocate sharing, and less when they do not. In addition, many Yupiit believe 
that if the people fail to respect or positively disrespect the natural environment, it will 
“get bad following its people.”38 This indigenous environmental ethic matches the idea of 
reciprocity and balance, as we will recall from Tsosie. 
Ella is becoming bad following its people, despite the clear warnings of 
community elders. This compounds the loss of traditional knowledge, which in turn 
amplifies ella's becoming bad, creating a cycle. Researchers and geographers say, 
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“[k]nowledge transfer and learning is not functioning as it was in the past.”39 There are 
several reasons for this. When the weather was more stable and predictable in the past, 
elders had extensive knowledge about conditions which was passed on to the younger 
people. In recent decades, Yupiit elders express that they can no longer rely on subtle 
clues that they previously had, for example in wind and snow patterns. The weather is so 
unpredictable that people commonly speak of “ella iqlungariuq”, or, ‘the weather is 
becoming a liar’.40 Because the climate is so unpredictable and elders are no longer a 
major source of vital knowledge for many Yup’ik communities, young people are 
becoming ‘deskilled’ at successful subsistence living.41 This in turn results in 
disengagement from relationships with elders and from subsistence living itself. With the 
elders in the community aging and a high child and youth population,42 traditional 
ecological and social knowledge is declining and the usual expectations of what will 
come are not met. This loss of traditional epistemological systems creates a harm to the 
Yup’ik people. 
 A third harm the Yupiit suffer, due partly to climate change, is mental and 
emotional hardship. Many Yup’ik people express despair and spiritual depression 
because of the rapid changes their homeland is undergoing.43 Drug and alcohol abuse is 
already high in Yupiit communities, and the current situation only magnifies the problem. 
Worries about impending coastal erosion, flooding, and scarce resources certainly does 
not help the situation of those people who may already be depressed or abusing 
substances. 
A fourth harm to the Yupiit is the loss of employment and income. For instance, 
most employed Yup’ik people of rural towns work for government agencies, oftentimes 
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for projects involving building and maintaining nearby infrastructure, but these 
employment opportunities have decreased significantly for rural Yup'ik people in recent 
years. Alaska spends $10 million every year on repairing roads damaged from thawing 
permafrost, usually prioritized for city roads, and this results in less funding for 
employment in rural projects.44 Along with this same point, many Yup’ik people also 
suffer extreme poverty that gets worse as a result of the various effects of climate 
change.45 For example, commercial fishing is a primary source of income as well as a 
subsistence resource for many Yupiit, but the practice is under threat. Warmer sea 
temperatures, combined with melting sea ice, have changed certain features of the water, 
which has affected fish stocks.46 Consequently, successful commercial and subsistence 
fishing has been more difficult for the Yup’ik people for the past thirty years. Decreasing 
employment and income is difficult to cope with for the villagers who spend an average 
of half their yearly income on subsistence technology, and is thus a serious harm.47  
A final harm to the Yup’ik people from (in part) the effects of climate change is 
that they “are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion and are planning to 
relocate.”48 With 90% of Alaska’s indigenous communities situated on the western 
coastline or riverbanks, most of these communities (86%) are vulnerable to erosion and 
flooding, incurring significant “adaptation burdens”.49 On Alaska’s coast, permafrost has 
warmed about 5°F in the past 30 years, rendering the ground so brittle it often falls into 
the sea in huge chunks. Thawing permafrost is further sensitized to a more volatile ocean 
wave pattern caused by melting sea ice, which is caused by warming temperatures.50 In 
the Yup’ik village of Newtok in southwestern Alaska, coastal erosion due in part to 
anthropogenic climate change, claims 83-100 feet of land every year,51 causing homes to 
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suddenly approach the water’s edge. Newtok has already lost 4,000 feet of land into the 
ocean due to coastal erosion in recent years and must relocate within the next four years 
at the risk of being completely underwater. The relocation will bring exorbitant costs.52 
The erosion of Newtok is an extreme case; however, as Fienup-Riordan notes, the 
“erosion is region-wide.”53 Newtok is nearly 100 miles away from the closest town or 
paved road, accessible only by small plane, boat, or snowmobile depending on the 
weather, making the relocation difficult and expensive.54 
The whole Newtok community has voted to move nine miles south of the 
Ninglick River, on higher ground in Nelson Island. But until the move to the new site, 
dilapidated infrastructure in Newtok fails to qualify for repair assistance because 
governmental agencies do not usually fund projects the costs of which exceed the 
projected benefits, and since Newtok residents will soon relocate, it does not make sense 
to fund expensive repairs in Newtok.55 This is especially frustrating considering that the 
site of Newtok as a permanent settlement was set by government authorities 
approximately 50 years ago.56 In addition, since the effects of climate change are gradual 
and often very subtle, often they do not qualify as a natural disaster for federal disaster 
relief.57 
Before moving on to the next section, I will consider an objection to my argument 
that the Yupiit suffer a cultural harm from climate change and offer a reply. The 
objection is that certain effects of climate change could be to the benefit to the Yup'ik 
people, such that the changes are better for the people on balance. For example, scientists 
predict that the Seward Peninsula will change from a relatively barren tundra landscape 
into a lush deciduous and spruce forest within the next 100 years.58 This transition will 
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create better economic opportunity with increased lumber resources and a more 
hospitable environment. In addition, newly mild summers will increase the tourism 
season and create economic growth for Native Alaskans and bring about a longer 
growing period, making commercial agriculture more profitable.59 Finally, melting 
glaciers have exposed ancient indigenous artifacts that otherwise would have been buried 
indefinitely.60 Prehistoric tools, clothing, and human remains have been discovered at 
retreating glaciers, and these objects may offer valuable opportunity not only for 
scientific research, but for indigenous peoples to learn more about their distant ancestors.   
I have two responses to this objection. First, while these circumstances may be 
beneficial in the short-run, they could subside or even become dangerous in the long-run 
due to environmental feedback loops. For example, with quick expansion of boreal 
forests comes not only lush forests and milder temperatures, but increased forest fires and 
beetle infestation.61 Not all ecological benefits are long-term benefits, and may bring with 
them further unforeseen disadvantages. 
Second, and more importantly, even if the benefits continued into the long-run, 
they are outweighed by a persistent cultural harm and do not justify past, present, or 
future GHG emissions. While the benefits of increased tourism and agriculture as a result 
of warmer temperatures are great, especially to Native Alaskans living in poverty, 
economic gain and more pleasant weather are minor profits and offer little solace to 
people who stand to lose their whole way of life. The Western perspective that 
industrialization and increased access to technology contributes to a better life is not 
necessarily one that the Yup’ik people share, and to attribute it to them is inappropriate 
and could enable ad-hoc justifications for GHG emissions and corresponding climate 
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change. However, if the Yup’ik people (especially the youth) do come to share the view 
that more technology contributes to a better life, the cultural harm will nevertheless 
persist if they must make a difficult trade-off between technology and preserving nature. 
If they do not care about preserving nature, then there will be no such trade-off and 
consequently there will be no cultural harm, at least to those who do not care to preserve 
nature. However, there should be concern if the Yup’ik people express such wishes as a 
result of coercion, subtle or otherwise.  
In addition, there will remain a serious harm to the Yupiit that comes with 
blocked access to their cultural life, or their ability to maintain the relationship of 
reciprocity and balance with the environment. Even the prospects of compensation for 
damage in the absence of mitigation for cultural harms may be inadequate, as illustrated 
in the case of the Sioux Nation’s refusal to accept payment from the U.S. for the unjust 
taking of the Black Hills, but demand for return of the land itself.62 Finally, a detail that 
the above objection overlooks, with respect to unearthed artifacts, is the possibility of a 
further harm of cultural appropriation. It is likely that if any ancient Native artifacts 
surface as a result of melting glaciers, they will be discovered not by the descendants of 
those who made the artifacts, but by others. If this happens, it is likely that these artifacts 
will end up in museums or for sale against the people’s will, as has been the historical 
trend.63 
In this section, five harms against the Yupiit were introduced. These harms are 
not independent from one another; rather, they each make up a single bundle of a cultural 
harm characterized by diminished access to a culture which is rooted in a kinship with 
nature. Each of the harms discussed belong to, and comprise, the larger category of 
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cultural harm with 'spiritual depression' as a result.64 Both Ellam Yua, or the Spirit of the 
Universe, and subsistence resources, suffer as a result of climate change, which deeply 
hurts the Yupiit and other similar peoples. “Cultural harm is both material and spiritual”, 
as Tsosie argues.65 In sum, the combination of harms facing the Yup'ik people, including 
the burdens of relocation, decreased employment opportunities and subsistence resources, 
emotional hardship, and loss of traditional epistemological systems, constitute a cultural 
harm of barred access to their own cultural system of reciprocity and balance with a 
sacred nature. 
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FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE; FORWARD-LOOKING AND BACKWARD-LOOKING 
PRINCIPLES 
In this section, I argue that the unequal share of burdens and benefits of climate 
change that the Yup’ik people face constitutes an unfairness. To do this, I draw on 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, as well as a couple of alternative conceptions of 
fairness to show the consistency of the result. I then discuss forward-looking principles of 
climate justice which have a focus on fairness as a theoretical grounding. After this 
discussion of fairness and forward-looking principles, I turn the focus to justice and 
backward-looking principles. (I thus separate the notion of justice and fairness, unlike 
Rawls. I utilize Rawls’ theory of fairness, but his theory is that of justice as fairness. 
However, because I argue that considerations of both fairness and justice, conceived as 
involving historic wrongs, are needed for an acceptable climate principle, the discussion 
of justice will depart from Rawls’ own theory of justice. My purpose is not to formulate a 
criticism of Rawls’ theory, but to utilize elements of his conception of fairness).66 I argue 
that the unfair situation that the Yup’ik face is, in addition to being unfair, also unjust, 
with the background assumption that justice is grounded in deontology and historic 
wrongdoing. To argue that the situation is unjust, I draw on arguments for reparative 
justice, as well as a couple of alternative conceptions of justice. I then discuss backward-
looking principles of climate justice which have a focus on reparative measures. In 
addition, I discuss some advantages of both types of principle. In the subsequent section, 
I argue that the two types of principle and theoretical groundwork should be integrated to 
formulate an acceptable climate principle. 
My argument will thus utilize these concepts of fairness and forward-looking 
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principles, and justice and backward-looking principles. Because John Rawls’ theory of 
justice as fairness is one of the most comprehensive and influential systems of fairness, I 
draw upon it. And, because his theory is relatively complex with many working parts, the 
discussion on Rawlsian fairness will be quite a bit longer and more detailed than the 
discussion on (non-Rawlsian) justice. For Rawls, justice as fairness are two sides of the 
same coin. The notion of forward-looking principles is essentially that of fairness; the 
two ideas are bound together. Forward-looking principles aim to distribute goods, such as 
climate benefits and burdens, to free and equal parties under the assumption of fair 
equality of opportunity. On the other hand, the notion of justice, which I use here, has to 
do with actions taken to repair a past wrongdoing. Justice necessarily responds to 
wrongdoing, and justice is done when the wrongdoing is erased or otherwise lessened in 
some way. The notion of backward-looking principles is bound together with the notion 
of justice; backward-looking principles aim to mend a past wrongdoing through a plan of 
action that the wrongdoer(s) ought to implement. 
It should also be noted that fairness and equality are not necessarily coextensive; 
there may exist a fair situation in which agents are not treated equally, and likewise an 
equal situation in which agents are not treated fairly. To illustrate: the terms of a race will 
be fair when the racers are treated appropriately according to their conditions, although 
this treatment will be unequal. The race will have fair terms if disabled people get a head 
start before the others in order to even out any differences in ability. Similarly, if all the 
racers in this community marathon were treated equally, or the same regardless of 
relevant differences, the conditions of the race will not be fair. It is clear that the current 
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climate situation is unequal; now I will turn to arguments showing that it is moreover 
unfair and why. First, we should discuss Rawls’ theory of fairness. 
Fairness 
Rawls 
What is ‘fairness’? Within Rawls’ theory, the level of fairness in a society is 
determined mainly by the way social institutions distribute rights and duties, as well as 
peoples’ holdings of advantages and disadvantages within society.67 In determining the 
fairness of a division of social goods, we refer to certain well-formed general principles 
of justice in a procedure whereby rational and “mutually self-interested persons are 
brought to act reasonably.”68 These principles are those that free and equal people in an 
initial situation of society would accept in a hypothetical social contract, and they will 
inform the fair terms of cooperation between free and equal people over a complete life.69 
In addition, acceptable principles of social justice will be chosen consistent with the rule 
of maximin, according to which the rational thing to decide is to choose the alternative 
with the best worst features.70  
In the context of political liberalism, Rawls argues fundamental political issues 
must be justified by public reason. This justification will appeal to public values (a 
political conception of justice) and public standards that rational and reasonable people 
will accept.71 No comprehensive doctrine, whether religious, philosophical, or moral, is 
accepted by all citizens, so no comprehensive doctrine can serve as the basis for the 
legitimate use of coercive political power. Only the public political culture, which 
includes the background ideas that all citizens are free and equal for fair cooperation in 
society can serve as a basis for political power.72 This is neutrality of aim: public 
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institutions and policy will not favor any comprehensive doctrine. Justice as fairness 
upholds the principle of state neutrality for a citizenry of free and equal people.73 
An important premise supporting the theory of justice as fairness is that holdings 
are “arbitrary from a moral point of view”74 and influenced by a natural lottery. The 
holdings consist of primary goods, or “things which a rational man wants whatever else 
he wants” in order to have a good life as a free and equal member of society.75 Primary 
goods are distinguished into two classes: social primary goods, including fundamental 
rights, liberties, opportunities, economic possessions, and the social bases of self-respect; 
and natural primary goods, including health and natural assets such as talents and 
abilities.76 Attaining enough primary goods helps us live a decent life.  
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls proposes two principles of justice: I. “Each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” II: “Social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.”77 The first of these principles is lexically prior to the second and 
thus is to have more weight for consideration than the second and is to be satisfied prior 
to the second principle’s being satisfied.78 The reason for this is that violations of basic 
liberties for the purpose of social and economic gain are always impermissible. Any 
social arrangement which violates these principles is unfair and unjust according to 
Rawls’ justice as fairness.  
Consider the principle of fair equality of opportunity within the second principle 
of justice. According to this principle, “social and economic inequalities are to be … 
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attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.”79 Each person is to have equal life chances for equal talents. Regardless of 
ability to attain certain primary goods such as education and healthcare, each person will 
have equal prospects as everyone else to access opportunities. For example, consider 
persons A and B, each of whom are motivated to become a medical doctor. Person A has 
wealth inherited from her parents and can afford to hire a tutor and attend an expensive 
prestigious university. Person B is poor and cannot afford a tutor nor tuition for an elite 
school. Ultimately, person A receives the competitive position as a medical doctor. 
Persons A and B do not exhibit fair equality of opportunity, since person A was in a 
better position to get the job because she was lucky enough to have the resources for 
which to better seize the opportunity. Both people have equal motivation, and both could 
be excellent doctors, but one person advances due to having more tools (undeservingly) 
than the other. According to Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity, people ought to have 
equal chances for achievement when they have equal talents, motivation, and the like.80 
Do the Yup’ik people have equal life chances for equal talents? It does not appear 
so. They have insufficient tools, compared to others, which they need to achieve their 
goals, and they are losing the tools they do have. For instance, the Yupiit lose income and 
wealth, and they incur significant adaptation burdens as a direct result of climate change 
in their areas, thus losing out on an important social primary good of economic holdings. 
They also miss opportunities to share traditional knowledge for hunting and safe travel, 
which in turn hinders opportunities to build and maintain relationships with elders. In 
addition, the Yupiit experience spiritual depression and a sense of despair as a result of 
their changing climate and their inability to stop the change, damaging their self-respect 
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(a primary good). The cultural harm which they face might be an instance of deprivation 
of the social primary good of self-respect, or it might be an instance of deprivation of the 
natural primary good of health (a deprivation of which would also affect equality of 
opportunity), or both.  
The preceding discussion concerns the part of the second principle of justice 
about equality of opportunity. Now, I will discuss the other part of this second principle, 
which is called the difference principle. According to the difference principle, “[s]ocial 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are … to the greatest expected 
benefit of the least advantaged.”81 This principle is supposed to assign a just distribution 
of wealth and income. Social institutions are be arranged so that any economic 
inequalities are to the advantage to “every party” involved, but most importantly to the 
advantage of those worst-off.82  
Who are the least advantaged? Rawls does not offer a very precise answer to this 
question and he thinks that any answer is likely to involve some degree of arbitrariness 
and might even be unnecessary.83 However, it seems clear that the least advantaged are 
characterized by an undeserved inadequate holding of primary goods.84 In A Theory of 
Justice, we see three main contingencies which determine whether an individual or group 
is least advantaged: family and social class one is born into, natural talents and abilities, 
and general luck in the ‘natural lottery’ of life.85 Also in A Theory of Justice, the least 
advantaged seems to be primarily an economic index, which could be set in terms of 
income (that of an unskilled worker, or that of half the median income); but elsewhere,86 
the least advantaged is an index of primary goods in general with a focus on how one 
came to be in one's present state. Roy Weatherford notes the former index simply 
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describes the current position of the least advantaged, whereas the latter index describes 
the current position of the least advantaged with the possibility that it is undeserved.87  
It is this latter index that I wish my argument to hinge upon, both because it is 
more interesting and because it maintains the normative relevance for later parts of the 
argument. So, for the argument's sake, let us stipulate that the least advantaged are 
characterized by an undeserved inadequate holding of primary goods and that they are 
part of the worse-off members of society.88 
Are the Yup’ik people part of the least advantaged? To answer this question, we 
need to determine their position with respect to three main contingencies: family and 
social class one is born into, natural talents and abilities, and luck in the natural lottery of 
life; and we will also need to characterize their holdings of primary goods. As far as the 
first contingency, the Yupiit are indeed typically born into a relatively low family and 
social class. They tend to have a lower socioeconomic status than many Americans.89 As 
far as natural talents and abilities, it is unclear how the Yupiit fare and any comparison 
here would only be speculative. However, it is probably true that since they have a low 
socioeconomic status, their ability to develop natural talents is limited. The most 
important contingency for our purposes is the third: general luck in the lottery of life. As 
far as this contingency for the Yup’ik people, it stems from, in large part, the family and 
social class they are born into. Because of the lower social class they tend to be born into, 
the Yupiit's general luck in life tends to be bleaker than average. It is also difficult to 
succeed in a culture with largely Western, Anglo-American values which is much 
different from their own.90 Part of the influence for the Yup’ik people’s position with 
respect to these contingencies is an inadequate holding of primary goods. As already 
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mentioned, the Yupiit lose out on the primary goods of opportunities (for transmitting 
traditional knowledge and subsistence practices), economic possessions including 
material subsistence resources, and to some extent self-respect which comes from 
spiritual depression. It seems the Yupiit have an inadequate holding of primary goods.  
But are their inadequate holdings undeserved? They are. An important reason why 
the Yup'ik people have inadequate holdings, and thus face an unfair distribution of 
benefits and burdens, is due to the effects of climate change which are caused through no 
fault of their own. They emit very little GHGs, but they suffer as a result of others’ 
emissions. Indeed, this is the moral significance of the situation.  
I think that these reasons support the claim that the Yup’ik people are part of the 
least advantaged members of society. It might be objected here that the index for the least 
advantaged I have used (that of holdings of primary goods in general with a focus on 
desert), is subject to the ‘index problem’ that the simpler economic index is not subject 
to. According to this problem, it is unclear how we are to measure primary goods against 
one another to determine who is the least advantaged. For example, it is unclear whether 
poor Yup’ik people are worse off than equally poor people in the inner city with bad life 
prospects. A second objection is that, if the Yup’ik were richer than others in society, but 
they lost their lifeways, the Rawlsian approach might not work because the Rawlsian 
approach does not count loss of lifeway in its measurement of the worst-off. What if 
victims of climate change were not the economically least advantaged? We could 
imagine a Malibu surfer, say, who loses his lifeway when his million dollar home burns. 
How could the Rawlsian deal with these cases?  
In response to this objection, it is true that the Yupiit are not the worst-off 
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members of society, according to either index. I have not tried to show that they are the 
worst-off in absolute terms; rather, I have tried to show that they belong to the class of 
worse-off people. There are others who are worse off than they, including some poor 
people in the inner city with very little opportunities. In addition, the least advantaged in 
one society might not be the least advantaged when placed into another. For instance, the 
Yupiit are part of the least advantaged of those people in Alaska (and perhaps the U.S.), 
but when considered from the standpoint of Haitians or Nigerians, the Yupiit are not the 
worst-off. The point is that the Yupiit are part of the least advantaged, characterized by 
an undeserved inadequate holding of primary goods (including income, health, self-
respect).   
I think the index of undeserved inadequate holdings of primary goods, and not the 
purely economic index, is the preferred one for our purposes because it maintains the 
moral element of desert, it is more comprehensive and gives a holistic picture of 
representatives, and it identifies persons’ life prospects more accurately than the purely 
economic index. For instance, consider that person A receives slightly more yearly 
income than person B, but person A has cancer and spends much of her money on 
treatment. (Or consider, person A’s cancer was caused by toxic chemicals leaking from 
the neighbor’s basement). According to the purely economic index, person B is worse-off 
than person A. But we might think this inaccurate – that person A is really the worst-off 
because she has a life-threatening illness that is expensive to treat, and it might have 
come through no fault of her own. For these reasons, I think the index according to 
undeserved inadequate holding of primary goods is the more useful of the two.  
The second objection points to the difficulty of the Rawlsian approach in dealing 
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with cases in which the victims of climate change lose their lifeways, yet are not 
economically least advantaged. My response to this objection draws upon the response 
given above. The index of undeserved inadequate holding of primary goods is helpful to 
determine who the least advantaged members of society are. This index avoids the 
objection, unlike the purely economic index, because it takes a comprehensive measure 
of primary goods. The reason why the Malibu millionaire who loses his lifeway due to 
climate change is not on a par with the Yup’ik subsistence person who loses her lifeway 
due to climate change is because the Yup’ik person is much worse-off than the Malibu 
millionaire measured by a holistic index of primary goods holdings. On the other hand, if 
the Yup’ik person were also a millionaire but lost her lifeway due to climate change, and 
was thus in the same position as the Malibu millionaire, then there would be no reason to 
treat them differently, except if the losses were due to some undeserved circumstance. 
Both millionaires in this example have lost their lifeways due to an undeserved 
destruction of climate change. Nobody deserves such destruction, of course. It happens 
that, in the case of the Yup’ik person, her losses are wholly undeserved – as a subsistence 
person, she emits very little GHGs. Indeed, what I have argued here departs and perhaps 
is comes to tension with aspects of Rawls’ theory due to the backward-looking element of 
historic wrongs. This is part of my rationale for taking an integrative approach which 
includes both considerations of fairness as well as considerations of historical notions of 
desert and wrongdoing, that is, justice. 
So why draw upon this aspect of Rawls’ theory, namely, the second principle of 
justice? Stephen Gardiner argues that one cannot simply take an aspect of Rawls’ theory 
to extend to the issue of climate change without providing adequate explanation for why 
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the given aspect of the theory is most appropriate to climate change.91 He argues that 
Rawls’ higher order principles, especially the first principle of equal liberty, could be a 
better guide than his lower order principles because environmental security is probably 
more important than the principle of fair equality of opportunity.92  
I have taken Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness, with a focus on the second 
principle of justice, to argue that the current climate situation facing the Yupiit (and other 
indigenous groups) is unfair. The second principle is more useful for our purposes, both 
because it is more relevant to the climate issue at hand (the first principle concerns 
liberties and freedoms, whereas the second concerns the distribution of goods and social 
equality), and because I think the first principle has already been satisfied. If it has been 
satisfied, then we can move to the second principle for consideration, as the two 
principles are in lexical order. This is not intended to be a complete argument, but only a 
reason why I choose to focus on the second principle of justice. It is controversial 
whether the first principle is satisfied by the current climate situation. One could argue 
that the climate situation impedes each person’s “equal right to the most extensive 
scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” I 
think that the situation (at least for the Yupiit) is not in violation of the first principle 
because this principle concerns primarily political liberties such as the right to vote, hold 
office, participate in political events, etc. It is not clear to me how environmental and 
cultural integrity would fit into this principle. I think that, understood as falling under 
existing primary goods, they more clearly fit with the second principle of justice. There is 
controversy about the lexical ordering of the two principles in general, as Pogge notes 
that certain basic economic goods are more important than civil and political freedoms.93 
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I agree with this, but my aim is not to debate the lexical ordering of the principles 
themselves, but to focus on the second principle of justice separately.  
In this section, I provided an explanation of one concept of fairness, that of 
Rawls’ justice as fairness. Using the second principle of justice, I argued that the current 
distribution of climate benefits and burdens, in the form of primary goods, is unfair. I 
have argued for this under the assumption of ideal theory in which all hypothetical parties 
agree to the principles chosen under favorable conditions, and the principles set up a just 
system. However, in the nonideal world in which we live, parties need to determine 
which principles to adopt under unfavorable conditions, but will nevertheless refer to the 
ideal theory to judge nonideal institutions.94 Later, we will look at some principles we 
might adopt under nonideal conditions and in doing so, work on finding a solution to 
problem of climate injustice. There, I will take an integrative approach, combining 
forward and backward looking considerations, that is, fairness and justice. To do this, I 
will add an element of reparative justice to Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. For now, 
in discussing the concept of fairness, let us turn to alternatives to Rawls’ view. 
Alternatives 
I will now briefly discuss two alternative conceptions of fairness and how the 
current climate situation might be unfair. This is for two reasons: first, in case the reader 
is unconvinced by the Rawlsian picture, there are other measures of fairness which are 
suitable. Second, if alternative conceptions of fairness also generate the answer that the 
situation is unfair, then this lends more support to the idea that it really is unfair. These 
alternatives are compatible with Rawls’ theory. The first conception of fairness is similar 
to Rawls’, only less complex; this is good for those who find Rawls’ conception too 
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complicated. The other alternative of fairness does not rely on any particular theory, but 
is a common sense notion. 
The first alternative comes from a classic argument, attributed to Adam Smith in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, of the impartial spectator. We are asked to imagine how 
an impartial spectator (or disinterested observer) who is a rational moral agent, might 
judge our behavior or a certain state of affairs.95 In addition, an impartial spectator will 
attach various moral emotions to the actors involved, such as guilt and shame for the 
wrongdoers, while empathizing with the victims.96 This argument has an advantage of 
simplicity over the idea of acceptable principles to parties in the original position, noted 
by Chris Brown: 
Whereas Rawls employs an elaborate fiction in order to arrive at his notion of 
fairness … Smith asks instead, what would an “impartial spectator,” someone (or 
several someones, because there could actually be numerous impartial spectators 
surveying the scene from different vantage points) observing from the outside, 
make of a particular state of affairs? This is much less cumbersome and 
complicated a notion than that of the original position, and it has the added 
advantage of not pretending to be a precise exercise.97  
 
If we were to consider what an impartial spectator(s) would accept as fair, would s/he 
accept the current distribution of burdens and benefits in the context of climate change? 
Would s/he accept a principle that orders this distribution? I think an impartial spectator 
would not accept either the current distribution or the principle that orders the 
distribution. This is because, as an uninvolved and objective agent, an impartial spectator 
can comprehend the moral elements of the situation very clearly and has no reason to 
accept an unfair distribution. Most importantly, an impartial spectator will think the 
distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as the principle which orders this 
distribution, is unfair.98  
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The second alternative conception of fairness explains the unfairness of the 
climate situation commonsensically. Stephen Gardiner writes, “...most of the cost of such 
emissions, and especially the most severe, are projected to fall on future generations, 
nonhuman nature, and especially the global poor.”99 Industrialization greatly benefits 
societies in terms of economies, technology, etc. such that the ecological harms that arise 
from development are outweighed by these benefits. On the other hand, for indigenous 
peoples, such as the Yupiit, the cost-benefit analysis is much different. As subsistence 
communities, they receive some, but not many, benefits as a result of industrialization. 
This is not only a problem for the Yup’ik, but for indigenous peoples globally. Indeed, 
dangerous climate change is a problem for the global poor. Dale Jamieson says, “[i]t is 
the poor who suffer most from climate-related disasters, and in the end they are largely 
on their own.”100 Because the poor receive such an asymmetrical share of the burdens 
from climate change, regardless who or what caused climate change, the situation is 
unfair. 
To summarize so far: In a previous section, I argued that the Yupiit experience 
cultural harm as an enormous burden from climate change, a burden which is unmatched 
elsewhere. From this, we can infer that the distribution of burdens in the context of 
climate change is unequal. This is the weaker claim. The stronger claim is that the 
distribution of burdens (and benefits) is also unfair, as supported Rawls’ theory of 
fairness and two alternatives. Now, I will discuss forward-looking principles of climate 
change which are grounded in fairness along with some advantages they offer as 
proposals to remedy the climate situation. 
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Forward-Looking Principles 
Forward-looking principles101 look to the future in order to determine the best 
course of action to mitigate (or adapt to) climate change. The current state of affairs is 
taken as the most important background condition to inform future policies. It might be 
that any history of injustices are irrelevant or unhelpful to the task of solving the present 
problem.102 Fairness and forward-looking principles are bound together because central 
to both conceptions is an acceptable distribution of goods among free and equal people 
(or nations) under the basic background assumption of equality between parties. 
Proponents of forward-looking principles rely primarily on fairness (albeit various 
different notions of fairness) to argue for their central claims. In this section, I consider 
some appealing reasons in favor of forward-looking principles. 
One reason why forward-looking principles with respect to mitigating climate 
change are appealing is because they aim at changing the social conditions themselves, 
which seems to get at the root of the problem. Under Rawls’ forward-looking approach, 
the structure of society is for mutual benefit and cooperation, and inequalities are justified 
only if the worst-off members are rendered better from this arrangement than they 
otherwise would be under any other arrangement.103 Along these lines, Darrel 
Moellendorf argues that the privileged status of the best-off suggests a responsibility to 
uphold principles which improve the conditions of the worst-off in society. Any costs 
which states incur for mitigation must, at the same time, not impede human development 
for the worst-off states. He writes, “[a] fair international framework to access of energy 
will ensure that the prospects of poor states to pursue human development are not made 
worse than under a business-as-usual scenario.”104 As we can see, climate change 
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mitigation principles which take a Rawlsian approach do not aim to assign fault or blame 
for past injustices. They aim at building or maintaining just social institutions which 
benefit the worse-off while supporting sustainable development in poor nations. 
 A second reason why forward-looking principles are appealing is because they 
tend to be feasible and pragmatic. Many proponents credit global cooperation and 
ultimately better mitigation results to forward-looking principles, especially given the 
absence of an enforcing supra-national authority. According to one such approach, 
defended by Martino Traxler, nations should reduce their emissions (luxury – not 
subsistence) in a way that corresponds to opportunity costs for them such that each will 
bear an equal share of the burden of reduced emissions. A cap in emissions would 
distribute equally burdensome shares of opportunity costs measured by human welfare. 
Importantly, Traxler argues is that backward looking arguments would involve nations in 
blame denial for excessive emissions, which would be counterproductive in attempting to 
resolve the problem of emissions reductions. Backward-looking considerations could 
hinder reductions agreements in climate negotiations, and thus provide reason for 
skepticism about them.105  
 Another forward-looking proposal which has the virtue of practical feasibility is 
one that assigns responsibilities for energy access and climate change mitigation in an 
ability-to-pay model. According to one proposal of this type, developed by Moellendorf, 
the greater burden of emissions reductions is assigned to the states with the highest 
human development and ability to take the cost. This proposal is politically feasible and 
retains the moral element of climate change with a commitment to mitigation and fair 
access to energy to further human development and escape conditions of poverty.106 
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Under this proposal, we move away from a fault liability or historic injustice conception 
of responsibility and move instead towards a forward-looking schedule of emissions 
reductions which picks out those states with the greater ability to pay as those that receive 
the greater burdens. 
 These forward-looking principles are grounded in fairness and propose to improve 
the present or future states of affairs without implying blame for historical wrongs. In the 
next couple of sections, we will look at quite a different approach, that of reparative 
justice and backward-looking principles, as well as reasons these principles are appealing 
as well.  
Justice  
Reparative Justice 
What is ‘justice’? One interpretation comes from Margaret Walker’s theory of 
reparations. In the first chapter of Moral Repair, Walker develops an account of what 
moral repair and restoration of moral relationships consists in.107 Moral relationships are 
governed by mutually recognized norms of appropriate moral behavior and systems of 
accountability if those norms are trespassed. If they are trespassed, moral repair demands 
the wrongdoer admit to misdoings, repair any harms, and compensate for wrongs. 
Victims of wrongdoing typically express a desire for the wrongdoer to fully acknowledge 
what s/he did was wrong and that the wrong act will not be repeated, as a matter of 
apology and moral amending. These victims must have opportunities to express their 
stories to the public and receive validation as well as support from others in order to be 
vindicated. Failing to empathize with and bolster the victims' injury is itself a serious 
moral wrong. Walker writes, "[m]oral repair is restoring or creating trust and hope in a 
  34 
shared sense of value and responsibility."108 Communities are responsible for 
maintaining the authority of valid norms, seeking acknowledgment of harm from the 
wrongdoer, and assuring victims that they will be helped (and seeing to it). We learn 
from Walker that moral repair can only happen when the victims' claims are validated 
and the aggressor is held accountable with the community's help. 
Similarly, Tsosie argues that reparations might involve acknowledgment of past 
harm, apology, material reparations, or all of these. Honest acknowledgment of past 
injustice is required to restore the victim and the relationship.109 Public apology is an 
important action that places responsibility on the wrongdoer and helps to further the 
healing process.110 Wrongdoers’ failure to apologize sends a symbolic message of 
indifference to indigenous peoples and other victims of injustices including dangerous 
climate change.111 If the wrongdoer decides to make reparations, those measures must 
make a sincere attempt to repair the victims and perhaps the relationship, with an 
emphasis on healing and reconciliation. Reparations should not be solely monetary.112 
Compensation without reparations is often inadequate and imposes a further harm. In 
addition, reparations for indigenous peoples must include full recognition of their right to 
self-determination as an equal nations engaged in an intercultural dialogue.113 Indigenous 
people consistently demand their right to participate in negotiations as equals. 
The current situation facing the Native Arctic peoples is unjust according to these 
models of reparative justice. The Yupiit emit far less GHGs per person than most others, 
but they experience at least as much harm to their environment and their lifeways as in 
more developed places, and often they see much more destruction, “bear[ing] the costs of 
their own victimization”.114 A valid moral norm has been violated, namely that 
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individuals ought not to bear the cost of their own victimization, and community 
members have not adequately supported the victims in their pursuit of justice. There has 
been seriously lacking acknowledgment of harm, and even less apology and 
compensation, on the part of polluters. This has been frustrating to Native Arctic Peoples. 
Inuit and Eskimo people brought the Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the U.S. in 2005, arguing that their 
fundamental rights had been violated by the acts and omissions of the United States 
related to the environment, and that the U.S. has a duty to provide reparations to them. 
The Petition states,  
The United States is obliged under international law to take responsibility for its 
contributions to global climate change both by limiting emissions and by paying 
reparations to those that it has harmed and continued to harm. The United States 
therefore has a duty to provide appropriate remedy and redress.115  
 
Breaches of responsibility create duties to repair the injustice of damage to cultural 
integrity.116 The Petition states that “the U.S. has violated its obligation to implement the 
Framework Convention in good faith…” evidence for which includes the fact that six 
U.S. states had banned mandatory emissions reductions.117 The U.S. has also violated its 
obligation to take a precautionary approach in light of less than absolute scientific 
certainty.118 In light of these failures by the U.S., arguments in the Petition suggest the 
U.S. has an obligation to make reparations for the purpose of erasing as much as possible 
the adverse consequences of their breach of obligations.119 
 The Inuit and Eskimo people demand reparations, but according to Walker’s 
theory, they also deserve community support. It is clear that members of the public have 
not backed nor validated their claim that the wrongdoers have indeed violated a valid 
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moral norm. As they have largely ignored the plight of the victims, members of the 
public have failed to vindicate these victims and to hold the wrongdoers accountable. 
Inuit and Eskimo people have also not received public apology from the wrongdoers, nor 
have they began the healing process with their participation. Because reparations for 
historical wrongs have not been made, the current climate situation is unjust according to 
the models of reparative justice constructed by Walker and Tsosie. 
Alternative 
I will now discuss an alternative conception of justice and how the current climate 
situation might be unfair. This is for the same two reasons that I considered alternatives 
to Rawlsian fairness: to give a balanced account for the reader, and to give further 
support to the claim that it really is unjust. This alternative conception of justice utilizes 
human rights; this is good for those who find reparative justice too demanding.120 This 
alternative is compatible with reparative justice. 
This alternative of human rights comes from indigenous peoples, including the 
Inuit and Eskimo people, who have fought for participatory control with respect to 
climate negotiations.121 Human rights are often grounded in autonomy and moral 
personhood, justified by the internal features of the person such as dignity, inherent self-
worth, rationality, or the capacity to will a universal moral law.122 Lavanya Rajamani 
argues that human rights claims bring attention to the dangerous effects of climate change 
on vulnerable populations and have the potential to influence climate negotiations by 
holding accountable those who have violated human rights. Existing climate treaties tend 
to allocate burdens in the context of rational self-interest, with little, if any, serious 
discussion of human rights. Rajamani writes that the claim of violation of human rights 
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has been a recurrent argument with indigenous peoples in particular, and especially with 
the Inuit peoples.   
Rajamani argues that moral, as contrasted from legal, human rights, are the most 
promising for a feasible and morally sensitive climate policy approach.123 She notes that 
many developed nations, especially the United States, have consistently rejected climate 
treaties which draw heavily on legal human rights. Recognition of moral human rights in 
climate treaties may provide grounds for assessing existing climate law and for ultimate 
legal recognition of some of these rights.124 Similarly, the International Council on 
Human Rights Policy (ICCPR) notes that a focus on human rights can add “considerable 
moral traction to arguments in favor of strong mitigation and adaptation.”125 Arguments 
for moral human rights in climate treaties could improve the outcome of climate 
negotiations for the most vulnerable. 
Many Inuit and Eskimo people themselves understand human rights, both moral 
and legal, as central guiding considerations for climate change negotiations. The Petition 
is largely an argument about moral human rights. The petitioners claim the U.S. has 
violated their “rights to the benefits of culture, to property, to the preservation of health, 
life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement, 
and inviolability of the home.126 A recurrent theme is the inseparability of culture from 
nature and the environment, the serious harm which comes from destruction of these, the 
serious harm which comes from forced relocation, and in general the damage to 
subsistence lifestyle through no fault of their own.127 In seeking relief from these harms, 
the arguments in the Petition appeal to moral human rights in addition to legal human 
rights.  
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Human rights in general are widely accepted in climate negotiations. Caney 
argues that climate change jeopardizes the human rights to life, health, and subsistence.128 
The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2007 expresses the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination and “the right to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of 
subsistence and development.”129 If this right is infringed upon by other governments, 
indigenous peoples are entitled to “just and fair redress.”130 In addition, the agenda for 
sustainable development adopted at the Rio Summit recognizes indigenous cultural 
norms and environmental ethics.131 
I think the Petition is convincing in its arguments that the U.S. has violated Inuit 
and Eskimo peoples’ moral human rights. The evidence they cite strongly supports their 
claim that the U.S. has violated their rights to culture, property, “to the preservation of 
health, life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, 
movement, and inviolability of the home.”132 Similarly, the Petition makes a convincing 
case that the Inuit and Eskimo suffer a cultural harm at the hands of industrialization. My 
earlier argument concerning cultural harm speaks to the same harms found in the Petition, 
which I argued constitute a cultural harm when taken together.  
To be sure, the right to be free from cultural harm is a negative right which limits 
others’ freedom to act in certain ways towards others or in ways which affect others.133 
Working from the premise that moral human rights are a concept of justice, it seems 
plausible that freedom from cultural harm is a moral human right. Freedom from cultural 
harm is a right supported by a ‘status-based’ approach which justifies the existence of 
rights from the nature of the rights-holder.134 The nature of the agent, whether it be 
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autonomy, dignity, rationality, or an alternative, creates duties of respect for the agent’s 
rights. A status-based approach is different from an instrumental approach, which 
justifies the existence of rights from their potential to produce optimal consequences. 
Rights are not things which are good because their existence and recognition bring about 
some greater end, such as the maximum expected happiness; but rights are important 
because rights-holders have dignity and are appropriate subjects of respect.135  
The status-based approach to human rights has significant overlap within 
indigenous rights to cultural and environmental self-determination. The Petition supports 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argument that “…the preservation and 
strengthening of the cultural heritage of these ethnic groups [validates] … their members’ 
potential as human beings.”136 Arguments in the Petition purport to maintain that 
freedom from cultural harm is a moral human right, as well as one widely recognized by 
various international reports and commissions;137 however, “[n]o U.S. law provides a 
remedy adequate to protect the rights alleged to have been violated in this petition.”138 
Moreover, if freedom from cultural harm is a moral human right, then the right to not be 
blocked from accessing to one’s culture will be as legitimate as the right to life, property, 
and privacy.139 From the premise that moral human rights are a conception of justice, and 
that cultural harm constitutes a moral human right, we can then infer that cultural harm is 
an injustice. This is a major conclusion which the Petition seeks to establish.140  
In this section, I have argued that the Yupiit experience cultural harm as a result 
of climate change amounts to an injustice. According to Walker’s theory of reparations, 
an injustice occurs when valid moral norms are trespassed and the wrongdoer fails to 
provide adequate reparations. Tsosie argues that reparations involve the wrongdoer’s 
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acknowledgment of harm and reconciliation with the victim. The Petition largely 
expressed the need for reparations in light of the U.S. violating moral human rights, as 
required by justice. In the next section, I will discuss backward-looking principles of 
climate change which are grounded in justice along with some advantages they offer as 
proposals to remedy the climate situation. 
Backward-Looking Principles  
Having considered forward-looking principles and reasons why they are 
appealing, I will discuss advantages of backward-looking principles. According to 
backward-looking principles141 of climate change mitigation, past activities, especially 
inequalities or injustices, are relevant for consideration as a matter of justice. The 
occurrence of past climate activities or injustices are relevant for consideration because 
they have shaped the conditions of the present state of affairs. When the Lockean proviso 
that “enough and as good” of a good previously held in common is left for others is 
unjustly violated, an injustice occurs. Going forward, historical emissions and/or 
injustices guide the formulation of principles aiming at correcting inequalities which 
arose from past activities or injustices. 
One reason why backward-looking principles with respect to mitigating climate 
change are appealing is because, in holding the responsible parties accountable for past 
emissions and past wrongdoings, such principles assign just deserts. Those who have 
caused past injustices or who have been a major cause of the climate problem are, for that 
reason, responsible for taking action to correct the problems now. The wrongdoers 
deserve to take responsibility for their actions or omissions, and they deserve certain 
burdens. For instance, a group of polluters who unjustly harmed others might deserve the 
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burdens of decreasing their emissions now, and acknowledging the harm they incurred on 
others.   
One example of a backward-looking principle that includes the notion of just 
deserts, as well as equity and fairness in climate change burdens and benefits, is given by 
Henry Shue. He argues that parties who have unilaterally imposed inequalities are 
responsible for taking extra burdens to help reverse the inequality. His first principle of 
equity reads: 
When a party has in the past taken an unfair advantage of others by imposing 
costs upon them without their consent, those who have been unilaterally put at a 
disadvantage are entitled to demand that in the future the offending party shoulder 
burdens that are unequal at least to the extent of the unfair advantage previously 
taken, in order to restore equality.142 
 
What is important about this principle and what sets it apart from forward-looking 
principles is not only the focus on previous arrangements which influence the levels of 
equality in the future, but also the claim-rights of some to require payments from others. 
The offending party’s taking a proportionate share of the burdens unfairly inflicted on the 
victim is necessary in meeting the requirements of justice. Similarly, some argue that “it 
is only right that [industrialized countries] should take the initial responsibility of 
reducing emissions while allowing developing countries to achieve at least a basic level 
of development.”143 Restoring (or creating) fair circumstances in emissions programs and 
assigning just deserts to responsible parties is a requirement of this type of proposal. 
 Another backward-looking principle which has the advantage of assigning just 
deserts is what Caney calls the “beneficiary pays principle” (BPP). An instance of the 
BPP is Eric Neumayer’s argument that developed countries, with their ill-gotten high 
standards of living, should be held accountable for the detrimental effects of developing 
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this lifestyle.144 The idea is when one party benefits by a certain activity which brings 
undue harm to another party, the benefiting party ought to discontinue the activity or else 
address the harms facing the other party.145 In the case of the Yup’ik people, the fact that 
climate change and its adverse effects are anthropogenic provides reason to help them in 
their suffering. Those who benefit from an industrialized lifestyle at others’ expense owe 
the victims help. If climate change and its adverse effects were not anthropogenic, then 
the well-off would not have a duty to help the victims in virtue of their causing the 
suffering. However, they may be morally required to help in order to alleviate suffering, 
or because the victims have absolute dignity, or something else. 
A second reason why backward-looking principles for mitigating climate change 
are appealing is because they can decrease incentives to emit excess GHGs. The polluter 
pays principle (PPP) is perhaps one of the most well-known backward-looking principles. 
As the name suggests, this principle assigns burdens to those who have emitted the most 
GHGs in the past, and as such, it has some deterrent effect.146 Any dis-incentivizing 
emissions will not only include a principle such as the PPP, but a system of compliance. 
These backward-looking principles are grounded in justice and inform plans for 
improving the present or future states of affairs based on the occurrence of historic 
wrongs. In this section, we discussed both fairness and forward-looking principles, justice 
and backward-looking principles, along with some of their advantages. In the next 
section, we will consider some problems with these principles, and determine how to 
combine them.  
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AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 
In this section, I argue that an acceptable principle of climate mitigation will draw 
on both forward-and-backward-looking considerations. Now that we have discussed 
some advantages of forward-looking and backward-looking principles, I would like to 
discuss some disadvantages of the principles and evaluate their overall merits. The 
overarching worry that applies to both types of principle is that neither is acceptable on 
its own without further supplementation. Many of the authors we have discussed so far 
echo this worry, and take themselves to construct hybrid principles while filling in the 
gaps between the theories they combine.  
Worries about the Principles 
I will discuss some problems with forward and backward-looking climate 
principles. Some of these worries will be my own, others will be not my own. Some will 
be both my own and others’, but this is unimportant. My responses to the worries are not 
defenses nor rejections for the principles, but are for the purpose of guiding the dialectic. 
 One worry regarding forward-looking principles is that they often ignore past 
inequalities or injustices, which itself is unjust. Gardiner writes that Traxler’s proposal 
“means ignoring the previous emissions of the rich, the extent to which those emissions 
have effectively denied the LDCs [Least Developed Countries] “their share” of fossil-fuel 
based development in the future, and the damages that will be disproportionately visited 
on the LDCs ...”147 Failing to acknowledge and redress historic unequal emissions is 
unacceptable from the standpoint of justice. It is not enough to simply move forward and 
forget about previous emissions activity.  
A second worry regarding forward-looking principles is that they tend to select 
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the very same responsible parties for purposes of assigning mitigation and adaptation 
burdens, namely, the developed, industrialized nations. For instance, those nations which 
have the highest ability to pay are the often the polluting countries. If backward-looking 
principles are unfeasible because leaders of political institutions for nations x, y, and z are 
unlikely to agree to an assignment of burdens which is justified by blame for past wrongs 
(as the forward-looking proponent argues), then why are forward-looking principles any 
more feasible when they assign burdens to those same leaders of nations x, y, and z? The 
putative benefit of political feasibility which comes with forward-looking principles 
might not be as great as thought.  
In response to this worry, the forward-looking proponent might respond that 
leaders of rich countries will more likely accept a schedule of burdens which is not 
justified by appeal to blaming for past wrongs, but rather merely assigns burdens based 
on current holdings. The justification for the assignment of burden matters most. In order 
to reduce emissions, we must sacrifice certain duties of justice, the forward-looking 
proponent might argue. However, I think that if we accommodate this sentiment and 
ignore much of the moral facet of the problem, this could send a symbolic message of 
indifference to those who suffer greatly from climate change, such as indigenous people 
including the Yupiit.148 More generally, it is important to hold responsible parties 
accountable for past wrongdoing if we want an acceptable account of climate justice.149 
Another worry with forward-looking principles has to do with those that aim to 
help the worst-off. Peter Singer argues that if one wants to formulate a mitigation 
principle using a Rawlsian approach, one could accept only a distribution which 
improves the situation of the worst-off, while the best-off are better off than those at the 
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bottom. An acceptable principle for distribution would require the rich nations bear all of 
the adaptation and mitigation burdens. The only way to argue against them bearing all the 
burdens is to hold that rich nations bearing all the burdens makes the poorest nations even 
worse off, but Singer claims this argument ultimately fails.150 
This worry begets further worries. Because a Rawlsian approach to formulating 
mitigation principles arranges distribution to improve the situation of the worst-off, it 
seems this arrangement is unsatisfactory for those situated in an intermediate position. 
Those who are not the worst-off, but are not the best-off either, are essentially ignored 
under this Rawlsian (or simply forward-looking) approach which allocates all burdens to 
the rich. Perhaps those who are in the middle could reasonably reject a climate mitigation 
principle which ignored their situation. For example, poor people in the U.S., or countries 
including China and India, while not the worst-off globally, nevertheless greatly suffer 
from the effects of climate change. This worry suggests that an acceptable climate 
principle will include some remedy for not exclusively the worst-off groups, but those in 
the middle as well.151  
In response to this worry, if the worst-off are significantly worse-off than those in 
the middle, then the worst-off are justified in demanding the most help from the 
standpoint of Rawlsian fairness. Similarly, if the level of justice is determined partially 
by the situation of the worst-off in society, then an acceptable mitigation principle will 
foremost address ways to improve the situation of the worst-off. Remedies for the worst-
off need not be in effect indefinitely; their purpose could be to improve their situation 
until they enjoy equal or near enough the prospects of those in the middle. 
After having discussed some problems with forward-looking principles, I will 
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now discuss some problems with backward-looking principles. One worry regarding 
backward-looking principles (which draw on egalitarian conceptions of justice, such as 
Shue’s) is that they assign emissions responsibilities to collective entities, but this 
approach is implausible. Caney argues that assigning responsibility to collectives is 
problematic because it entails that we should assign responsibility (and burdens) to 
individual persons who comprise the collective entity. He argues that principles assigning 
burdens to a collective would penalize descendants of privileged families by depriving 
these descendants equal opportunity in order to rectify past unfairness. Depriving these 
individuals of equal opportunity does nothing to change the historic inequalities of 
opportunity and is wrong.152 Backward-looking principles are objectionable insofar as the 
actors who caused early emissions were non-culpably or excusably ignorant of the 
harmful side effects.153   
In response to this worry, it seems that descendants of privileged families today 
are not deprived of equal opportunity at all; in fact, they tend to continue to be better off 
than those who are not descendants of privileged families. As lucky beneficiaries of the 
products of industrialization, the ‘descendants’ are happy to collect the rewards which 
come with such a status. It is not terribly unreasonable to ask them to pay the costs which 
come with the benefits, even if only a matter of civic responsibility. Thomas Pogge 
writes, “[t]he privileged of today are quick to point out that we cannot inherit our 
ancestor’s sins. Indeed. But how then can we be entitled to the fruits of these sins…?”154 
The unfairness that came with past emissions which harmed non-emitters has carried over 
into the present, shaping the current state of affairs.155 The moral upshot is, I think, 
something like Shue’s first principle of equity, according to which the disadvantaged are 
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justified in requiring parties who may be responsible for taking unfair advantage of them 
to pay compensatory burdens in order to restore equality.  
In addition, if polluters were culpably ignorant or otherwise acting with gross 
negligence, they nevertheless might be held responsible, though not punished.156 One 
reason for this is that they should have (and should now) adopt the precautionary 
principle and avoid risking climate damage even if there is less than certain scientific 
evidence to support doing so. A final response to Caney’s worry is that it seems difficult 
to avoid assigning burdens to any other entity but individuals. There does not seem to be 
a fatal problem with assigning burdens to individuals who emit excess GHGs, nor to 
assigning burdens to each individual in a collective entity even though some individuals 
have not emitted excess GHGs. 
A second worry about backward-looking principles is that they are unfair. This 
worry is relevant to the (unqualified) PPP. Because it does not distinguish between 
emissions from poor countries and emissions from rich countries, the PPP renders the 
poor vulnerable to pay for their pollution, which is unfair and a form of “environmental 
colonialism.”157 For example, an unqualified PPP would make developing countries pay 
for their emissions in equal proportion to the payments that developing countries pay for 
their emissions. India, as a country developing its industrial sector, is bringing millions of 
people out of poverty as a result. If such industrialization (by emitting GHGs) is also the 
way in which the already developed countries have brought their once-impoverished 
citizens out of poverty, then those developed countries ought not to prevent other 
countries from doing the same, as a matter of fairness and equality.  
Another worry about backward-looking principles, and the PPP in particular, is 
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that, as lacking both a background theory of entitlements and a system for ensuring 
compliance, the PPP is incomplete.158 The PPP maintains that some parties ought to pay 
because they have exceeded their entitlements. According to Caney, the PPP “must be 
located within the context of a general theory of justice, and on its own, it is 
incomplete.”159 While this worry is serious, notice that it applies only to the PPP taken 
alone – it targets arguments in favor of the PPP which do not provide supplementation for 
a general theory of entitlements. Either such a general theory is simply assumed without 
explicit argument, or it is not and the PPP is taken on its own. However, Caney’s worry 
will dissipate once one argues for some kind of background theory of entitlements to 
supplement the PPP. Regarding the worry that the PPP lacks a system for ensuring 
compliance, note that this problem will also apply to forward-looking principles, 
although perhaps to a much less extent if parties perceive them to be more fair than the 
PPP. In any case, an acceptable climate principle will include some proposal for optimal 
compliance.160  
In this section, we considered several problems for both forward-and-backward-
looking principles. Regarding forward-looking principles, there were three worries: these 
principles often ignore historic injustice, which is itself wrong; these principles are not as 
politically feasible as claimed because they assign burdens to much of the same parties as 
backward-looking principles; and they unfairly favor the worst-off parties while ignoring 
those in an intermediately-situated position. Regarding backward-looking principles, we 
also discussed three worries: These principles penalize innocent parties by assigning 
burdens to them, although they are not responsible; these principles are unfair insofar as 
they assign burdens to emitters, regardless of development level; and the PPP in 
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particular is incomplete, as it lacks a background theory of justice upon which to ground 
entitlement claims and compliance. In the next section, we will discuss a way to avoid 
some problems that come with exclusively forward-or-backward-looking principles – 
namely, by combining both types of principle. 
Combining the Principles? 
Taken together, the worries about both forward-and-backward-looking principles 
stated above suggest that neither exclusively backward-looking nor forward-looking 
principles are desirable without modification. But since both types of principle also have 
great advantages, we should not jettison them completely. On the one hand, 
considerations of political feasibility with respect to assigning mitigation and adaptation 
burdens are important. On the other hand, considerations of fairness and correcting past 
injustices are also important. So a merger between forward-and-backward-looking 
principles might avoid these problems. Indeed, that we should not have to choose 
between this dichotomy is a sentiment expressed by most of the philosophers we have 
discussed.  
But is such a combination consistent? Can we have a principle of climate justice 
which utilizes both forward-and-backward-looking principles in a coherent way? These 
are the questions reflective equilibrium requires us to answer.161 To see how such a 
combination principle can indeed work, consider Boxill’s argument drawing on both 
forward-and-backward-looking principles in the context of affirmative action. He 
distinguishes compensation and reparation, noting that compensation is a requirement of 
justice in order to ensure fairness in equality of opportunity and a requirement that holds 
regardless of whether a past injustice occurred. Compensation is owed to persons because 
  50 
they have dignity and rights to pursue what they find valuable.162 An example of 
compensation is a community’s helping to pay for a disabled person’s wheelchair so that 
she may more easily pursue what she finds valuable. Reparation, on the other hand, is a 
requirement of justice in order to correct past injustices and to acknowledge wrongdoing. 
The concept of reparations is always connected to historic injustices, inequalities, and the 
like.163 An example of reparations is a community’s helping to pay for a person’s 
wheelchair because they were somehow at fault for her disability. In this way, 
compensation is forward-looking and reparation is backward-looking.  
Boxill argues that reparations for slavery should be made by the present 
community even if the present community is not culpable for the past injustice, but 
because they have inherited benefits (fruits of labor) which rightfully belong to 
descendants of slaves, and the descendants of slaves are made worse off by the past and 
present injustices. Because the descendants of slaves have been “reduced to their present 
condition by a history of injustice,”164 they are less able to realize their right to pursue 
what they find valuable as they would have been if their ancestors were never enslaved. 
The descendants of slaves’ claims to receive both compensation to render their life 
prospects equal to others and reparation to correct past injustice, are not mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, the justice of reparations in this case holds independently of 
whether the parties to give reparations are themselves guilty of an injustice, but rather 
because they are beneficiaries of current unjust holdings. One might disagree with 
Boxill’s substantive argument, but accept the structure as valid. 
Boxill’s argument demonstrates how backward-looking and forward-looking 
principles could be consistently merged. To formalize his argument: community A owes 
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some x or an equivalent to community B when i) x was unjustly transferred from B to A 
and ii) the consequences of the unjust transfer impede B’s current equality of opportunity. 
Notice how community A, in giving x or an equivalent back to its rightful owner B 
precisely because x was unjustly transferred, gives reparations to B. At the same time, A 
gives x or an equivalent to B in order to support or reinstate equality of opportunity for B. 
This transfer is at once both compensation and reparation.  
But what is the ‘transfer’ in the problem of climate change? It is the transfer of 
mitigation and adaptation burdens and in primary social goods from one group to another. 
For example, adaptation burdens in the form of financial costs are transferred from 
industrialized places such as the U.S. onto subsistence communities such as the Yup’ik 
people. The costs of adapting to climate change, such as relocation expenses, are unjustly 
transferred onto the Yupiit. When the mechanism for A’s high standard of living 
ultimately makes B’s standard of living worse, A has a duty both to repair the damage 
and to compensate B in order to support equality of opportunity. 
It might be objected that the situation is not this simple because communities A 
and B with respect to the climate problem are indeterminate. Given the global 
connectedness of our world today, it is nearly impossible to assign labels of ‘polluter’ and 
‘victim’ to various countries. (Even if we could do that, it will remain unclear as to who 
are the individual polluters and the victims). In response to this objection, I will follow 
Jamieson in replying that the class of winners and losers are fairly determinate. The poor, 
wherever they live, tend to suffer the most from the effects of climate change while the 
rich tend to suffer the least because they have the means to protect themselves from 
dangerous climate change. The Yup’ik people are a vivid instance of those who suffer as 
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a result of climate change, but they are part of a larger body of those who suffer 
significantly.  
Boxill’s argument manifests a how a coherent merger might be expressed 
between both compensation and reparation, both fairness and justice. The two concepts 
need not be opposed towards one another – rather, they can reinforce each other. 
Backward-looking principles and forward-looking principles can be coherently integrated 
into one climate principle. 
Working towards a Balanced Integration of Principles 
What would a theory which combines both forward-and-backward-looking 
principles look like? Caney supports the idea of an integrative approach with respect to 
principles assigning climate burdens. He argues for a “hybrid account”, which states 
“...the most advantaged have a duty to construct institutions that discourage future non-
compliance (an ‘ability to pay’ principle)”.165 The hybrid account depends on three 
premises about duty. The first is that all persons have a duty not to emit more GHGs than 
allowed by their assigned quota in international treaties; the second is that if persons do 
exceed the allowance, they have a duty to compensate others (revised PPP); the third is 
that the most advantaged persons have a duty to reduce GHG emissions in proportion to 
harm (mitigation), or to address the bad effects of climate change (adaptation).166 The 
hybrid account is supposed to address both historic wrongdoing as well as current ability 
to pay.  
Similarly, Singer argues for a global emissions trade in which nations could buy 
and sell emissions quotas within a policy of equal per capita shares on a set amount of 
global emissions. The solution of global emissions trade has a forward-looking element, 
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as “the point is not to punish nations with high emissions but to produce the best outcome 
for the atmosphere.”167 Global emissions trade also has a backward-looking element of 
the justice in poor nations’ ability to sell emissions quota. Singer also seriously considers 
the possibility of those people whose lands are destroyed by climate change to win 
damages, or to impose sanctions, on the responsible party.168 
 While these hybrid principles are better (more complete, feasible) than either 
exclusively forward-looking or exclusively backward-looking principles, they do not 
sufficiently integrate both types of principle. Caney’s hybrid account and the proposal of 
global emissions trade advocated by Singer do not give enough emphasis to backward-
looking considerations. Caney’s principle seems not to adequately address historic 
environmental wrongs to vulnerable populations; and Singer’s principle includes no 
account of the wrongdoer giving honest acknowledgement of historic wrongs or 
attempting to repair relations. It is not expected that an acceptable integrative principle 
for climate change be exactly equal in its combination of these two considerations, but it 
is nevertheless desirable to place enough emphasis on problems of justice.169 Given 
Boxill’s argument in the previous section, and keeping in mind Rawls’ claim that justice 
as fairness is an ideal theory which will need to be supplemented with an account of 
justice to remedy wrongdoing, there is no reason for backward-looking and forward-
looking principles to be mutually exclusive. In particular, given the past and present 
injustice that the unfair distribution of adaptation burdens and primary goods imposes on 
the Yup’ik people and others, and the cultural harms placed on them through the effects 
of climate change, climate principles which clearly and thoroughly address issues of 
justice backward-looking considerations are most acceptable to most parties involved. 
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CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? 
  
Justice and fairness need not be mutually exclusive in the context of climate 
mitigation principles. In particular, forward-and-backward-looking principles should be 
integrated in a climate principle which addresses the problem of indigenous peoples 
suffering from the effects of climate change. Many indigenous groups, such as the Inuit 
and Eskimo, express a need for reparative justice measures from polluting parties. As 
these people are among those who suffer the most, it is reasonable to suppose that their 
claims should be seriously considered in addition to other parties involved. An acceptable 
climate mitigation principle will thus integrate considerations of both fairness in a 
schedule of burdens which is politically feasible and reparative measures for past 
injustices and perhaps recognition of moral human rights in climate treaties. 
Early on in this paper, we discussed the problem of relocation facing the Yup’ik 
people and three options they and the state might choose. First, the Yupiit could move 
their entire village a few miles away, and with state help in the form of financial 
assistance. This plan will cost the state the most by far, but it is the preferred option 
among the Yupiit as it enables preservation of their culture. Second, the Yup’ik could 
move to another nearby city or town, such as Fairbanks also with state financial help. A 
third alternative is that the Yupiit could choose either of these two options, but the state 
would not provide financial assistance.  
The first option is certainly desirable insofar as it maintains any cultural integrity 
the Yup’ik have left. This option is most preferable from a standpoint of a purely 
reparative justice proponent, as it erases the damage of historic wrongdoing, whatever the 
cost. The third option is attractive to a libertarian, who might argue that the state should 
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exert minimal involvement. However, some libertarians, such as Nozick, might argue 
against this option because they think the state should adopt a one-time redistribution of 
property to remedy inequalities. My argument, perhaps surprisingly, supports the second 
option. According to Rawls’ conception of fairness and forward-looking principles, the 
Yup’ik people deserve non-extraordinary resources sufficient to provide equal life 
chances for equal talents with the state’s help. The state is not required to positively 
promote the preservation of certain lifeways or cultural integrity, so Rawls’ fairness rules 
out the first option. However, the inclusion of justice and backward-looking principles, 
especially Shue’s first principle of equity, adds something further. Drawing on moral 
reparations, the state should publicly acknowledge the past injustice of emissions which 
harmed the Yup’ik. This seemingly small gesture could have significant positive effects 
for the Yup’ik peoples and help lift the dark cloud. In addition, the state ought to provide 
some measures to actively maintain the Yup’ik culture, such as paying stipends for 
housing and subsistence equipment and hiring native language-speaking schoolteachers. 
In the realm of the nonideal world, these measures would be in the interest of the Yup’ik 
people and would allow optimal access to their culture, while still costing much less for 
taxpayers than moving each house to a new site as per the first option.170 
Certainly, there are limits to Rawls’ theory as far as supporting cultural rights and 
lifeways. Recall that under his view, fundamental political issues must be justified by 
public reason by appeal to public values and public standards that rational and reasonable 
people will accept. Reasonable citizens will accept fair terms of social cooperation for 
each citizen, but it is unclear whether the public would agree to support the Yupiit rights 
to culture and lifeway with their tax dollars at such an expensive cost. (This supposes a 
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descriptive claim about how people might think about utilizing public funds in the 
nonideal world, and is thus not wholly normative). However, it is true that Rawls’ 
account is consistent with certain cultural protections. Kymlicka writes, “these special 
[cultural] rights … are in fact consistent with liberal principles of equality. They are 
indeed required by the view, defended by Rawls and Dworkin, that justice requires 
removing or compensating for undeserved … disadvantages…”171 Certain special rights 
enable members of minority cultures to live on equal terms as the majority. Justice as 
fairness allows equality of opportunity to pursue any permissible conception of the good, 
including chosen lifeways. 
 I have provided an argument for an integrative approach between fairness and 
justice, forward-and-backward-looking considerations in addressing a resolution to 
environmental harm regarding the Yupiit. I have not provided an explicit principle to that 
effect, nor have I intended to. Formulating an acceptable principle is an occasion for 
further work. Neither have I discussed some of the most important objections concerning 
this integrative approach. I have only tried to provide reasons to demonstrate why such an 
integration is desirable. Finally, a more complete discussion will include indigenous 
groups in addition to the Yupiit, and perhaps those who suffer the most from climate 
change in a global context. This discussion could include the poor, future generations, 
and nonhuman nature. Both justice and fairness require the powerful to pay immediate 
attention to the situation of the worse-off. 
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159 Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice 134 
 
160 I will not argue for any proposal for optimal compliance with respect to climate principles here 
due to space concerns. 
 
161 Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium is that of moving from our theoretical convictions, 
considered judgments, and particular cases to determine levels of coherence and acceptability among these 
components. See Theory of Justice 40-45. 
 
162 Boxill, Reparation 115. 
 
163 Boxill, Reparation 116.  
 
164 Boxill, Reparation 117. 
 
165 Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice 136. 
 
166 Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice 136. Also note that Caney argues that the subjects of assigned 
burdens are persons, and not states. 
 
167 Singer, One Atmosphere 196. 
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169 For an alternative view, see Traxler. Traxler argues parties will agree to climate negotiations 
only if they perceive the allocation to be fair. If considerations of justice and backward-looking principles 
make an agreement less likely, they should be sacrificed. But, while it is true that world leaders fail to sign 
climate treaties that they perceive as unfair (e.g., President Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol; Australia 
signed the Kyoto Protocol but repeatedly refused to ratify it until 2007, resulting in targets that were not 
legally binding), more empirical evidence is necessary to determine whether Traxler’s prediction is correct 
on a larger scale. In any case world leaders often sign climate treaties which they do not perceive to be fair 
or in their own best interests (e.g., financial contributions to the Adaptation Fund for developing countries 
made by Sweden and Belgium; agreements during the 2013 UN Climate Change Conference to provide 
financial and other assistance to adaptation for threatened populations). See Anita Talberg, et al. 
“Australian climate change policy: a chronology,” Parliament of Australia, 2013. Web. 20 Feb. 2013. See 
also Adaptation Fund, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, rpt. 
at (31 I.L.M. 849, 1992). UNFCCC. Web. See also United Nations, UN Climate Change Conference in 
Warsaw keeps governments on a track towards 2015 climate agreement, Warsaw, 23 November 2013, 
Web. 20 Feb. 2014. 
 
170 If the first and second options were of equal cost, then my argument would support either one, 
but especially the first option of moving each house to the new location.  
 
171 Will Kymlicka, “The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas,” Political Theory 20.1 
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